THE ESSENTIAL MONROE FREEDMAN,
IN FOUR WORKS*
Michael Tigar**
Capturing Monroe's sixty years in the law, and the fifty
years of our friendship, would be impossible. What does it truly
mean to be a lawyer? Monroe addressed this question in so many
contexts that no summary can do him justice. His is an integrated,
considered body of work, based on human experience-his own and that
of colleagues and clients. And, as you can see in everything he wrote, he
also took vicarious account of injustices recorded in annals of the law
and the lawless.
One cannot appreciate his contributions by reading a summary or
bibliography, and I will not attempt to provide one. His work is not a
series of episodes. Taken as a whole, it is a finely woven tapestry, in
which we will continue to find new insight. Monroe would reject Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s image of "the law," but Holmes's metaphor of
Bayeux suggests something important about Monroe's work:
When I think thus of the law, I see a princess mightier than she who
once wrought at Bayeux, eternally weaving into her web dim figures of
the ever lengthening past-figures too dim to be noticed by the idle,
too symbolic to be interpreted except by her pupils, but to the
discerning eye disclosing every painful step and every world-shaking
contest by which mankind has worked and fought its way from savage
isolation to organic social life.
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The tapestry image appeals to me because Monroe's work was not
conceived all of a sudden and then worked out over time. His ardent,
insistent, probing, sometimes fierce or sardonic-almost never solemnmethods of inquiry led him to embroider the main themes of his work
with new examples and insights, and even at times to go back and
change an emphasis or rendering.
I met Monroe in 1966, shortly after I came to Washington, D.C.
Our mutual friend, Ralph Temple, was staff counsel of the ACLU in
D.C.' There was a time when the three of us considered forming a law
firm-Freedman, Temple, and Tigar. But we did not, though we kept in
touch for all the intervening years. Ralph died in 1978.
We three moved away from Washington in different directions, but
we continued the conversations we had begun every time we met.
Many people know about Monroe's and my debate about how and
why we choose our clients, and what, if any, justification we should
have for our choices. We came at this issue from different perspectives,
sometimes in harsh disagreement. The fundamental issue for both of us
was every lawyer ought to have some vision of his or her social
responsibility. That is, the things we call "rules of professional
responsibility" do not define the field of ethics properly so called. These
rules, which Monroe at times decried as too limited, too timid, and
sometimes solipsistic, define at most some small part of what lawyers
are and should be. What we wrote and said was impassioned, though I
think with mutual respect.
Just a hint, then, of what he thought and believed and gave to us.
Let me visit four of his works: One of his paeans to Lord Brougham; his
calling to account two lawyers who abandoned a death row client; a
sharp attack on prosecutors who lie and cheat; and finally, his
iconoclastic look at Atticus Finch.2

1. Known at the time as the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union, it is now the
American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area.
2. See Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch-Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REv. 473 (1994);
Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham-Advocating at the Edge for Human Rights, 36
HOFSTRA L. REv. 311 (2007) [hereinafter Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham]; Monroe H.
Freedman, ProfessionalDiscipline ofDeath Penalty Lawyers andJudges, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 603

(2013); Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Unethical and UnconstitutionalPractices and Policiesby
Prosecutors'Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, The Use of Unethicaland
UnconstitutionalPractices].

2016]

THE ESSENTIAL MONROE FREEDMAN

661

LORD BROUGHAM

In 2007, Monroe convened a conference at Hofstra to consider
"lawyering at the edge." He called his own contribution Henry Lord
Brougham-Advocatingat the Edgefor Human Rights.' Brougham's life
and litigation had long engaged Monroe's attention. While representing
Queen Caroline of England in the House of Lords-the "peer" sitting as
a jury-Brougham had defined the advocate's role in terms that
adumbrated Monroe's own ideas. Warned that his representation of the
Queen might endanger the monarchy, Brougham said:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it
should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
Monroe loved that statement. He quoted it many times and defended his
view of Brougham from critics who claimed that Brougham himself had
later in life softened his vision of the advocate's duty of zeal.
Monroe's 2007 Hofstra essay takes our view beyond the
"professional responsibility" of principled and zealous representation. It
was never Monroe's view that all lawyers must be "at the edge" in terms
of seeking social justice. You might choose to be a prosecutor, or to
represent wealthy people or corporations, provided you did so in
harmony with the rules of professional responsibility. I do find in his
work a suggestion that those rules ought to make pro bono work a duty,
the breach of which can be enforced with professional discipline, rather
than merely advising that lawyers do such work.
Monroe also counseled that lawyering at the edge was not
lawyering "over the edge." If properly interpreted, the rules of ethicsor professional responsibility if you will-not only allow but require the
lawyer to court the risks of which Brougham spoke.
Brougham was a zealous campaigner, opposing not only the
institution of slavery but the entire array of social injustices of England
in the early 1800s. We can easily understand Monroe's approval of
Brougham's views on the advocate's role in litigation, but what is a
professor of professional responsibility doing by lauding Brougham
3. Freedman, Henry LordBrougham, supranote 2.
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social justice advocacy in the context of a symposium on what lawyers
ought to be doing?
Monroe's essay contains the key. He begins by quoting a racist
1858 speech by Abraham Lincoln, and contrasts it with Brougham's
antislavery oration of 1838. He laments that Brougham is largely
forgotten, while Lincoln is celebrated as an emancipator.
One is led to think of Vachel Lindsay's paeans to Governor
John Peter Altgeld, Clarence Darrow's friend and mentor, who
pardoned the Haymarket defendants. Lindsay's poem is called
"The Eagle That Is Forgotten." And in the poem "Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,
Bryan," Lindsay wrote:
Where is Altgeld, brave as the truth,
Whose name the few still say with tears?
Gone to join the ironies with Old John Brown,
Whose fame rings loud for a thousand years.
Monroe was always willing to debate a point. But when the
principle was seen, analyzed, and defended, he would not temporize, nor
heap praise on someone who did. He also knew, from study and personal
experience, that lawyers see the human condition more closely than
those in most other professions. Having seen injustice close at hand, one
might not have the duty to address it, but certainly one could not claim
to be doing that while in fact acting half-heartedly and with faint effort.
Monroe was too modest to make the comparison, but we can.
Brougham pushed the idea of zealous advocacy to a limit that
many powerful people found unacceptable. He confronted social
injustice. He took his advocacy-including his defense of Queen
Caroline-into the public media. This sounds a lot like our friend
Monroe, and we will remember the example he set as much or more than
what he wrote and said.
Put another way: To stand, as Monroe did for six decades, and
confront social injustice against all manner of attack, requires a firm
sense of who you are and what you are doing. That in turn requires that
you live by the standards you have set for others and that you claim to
have set for yourself. Monroe did not simply talk about a subject called
"ethics." He was ethical.
MAPLES V. THOMAS, 132 S. CT. 912 (2012)

In 2013, Monroe discussed the professional responsibility issues in
capital case representation. The ABA Guidelinesfor the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases had by that
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time-twenty years after first appearing-been revised and
strengthened. Many courts had cited them with approval and some
courts regarded them as setting out enforceable minimum standards.
Yet Monroe's discerning analysis of the ABA standards is not, for
me, the most revealing part of the article. It is Monroe's dissection of
lawyer performance in Maples v. Thomas that shows us Monroe's
philosophy of client representation.
Here is an abbreviated summary of the facts: Cory Maples was an
Alabama criminal defendant. His trial counsel was underpaid, illprepared, and ineffective. Mr. Maples was sentenced to death. Two
associates in the New York firm of Sullivan & Cromwell entered the
case and agreed to assist Mr. Maples in filing for state court postconviction relief. This was a necessary step towards an eventual federal
habeas corpus petition.
The two lawyers helped to draft a state trial court post-conviction
petition but then did nothing to get a hearing on the petition. They then
left Sullivan & Cromwell to pursue other opportunities. When the
Alabama trial judge denied the petition, the order came to the Sullivan
Cromwell mailroom. Because the two lawyers were no longer at the
firm, the mailroom clerk returned the envelope to the Alabama court
clerk unopened.
This default meant that Mr. Maples's further state court
proceedings were futile, and his eventual federal habeas corpus petition
was denied because he had failed to avail himself of his state court
remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the two associates'
abandonment of their client excused the procedural defaults.
Monroe's discussion of the Maples case leads us away from the
intricacies of procedural default to ask what should happen to lawyers
whose inattention to their duties imperils a client's life. Here is Monroe
in top form. He arraigns the two associates, their law firm, their law
partner, and their Alabama local counsel. He then circles back to focus
on the associates. Neither of these young lawyers has showed any
appreciation of their misconduct. None of the lawyers, nor the law firm
itself, has been subjected to professional discipline.
Monroe contrasts this failure to enforce standards with proceedings
taken against defense counsel who are claimed to have been too
vigorous in seeking to prevent a client's execution. And he notes
that judges who appoint counsel are often complicit, appointing lawyers
who are not qualified, or failing to provide adequate resources for
the defense.
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Monroe's analysis characteristically takes in all the elements of the
systemic failure of effective representation in capital cases. But the
flame of his passion for justice burns most clearly when he illuminates
two issues. The first of these is the lawyers' lack of commitment to a
client they are sworn to defend. Death penalty work has a certain
glamour and cachet for lawyers in big firms whose daily legal diet may
be tedious.
These two young lawyers came into the case and quickly saw the
most important issue. And then when it was time for the difficult,
frustrating, and time-consuming business of getting a hearing date, and
of making sure that the case was in good hands, they walked away. The
litany of professional responsibility rules that these lawyers and those in
their firm violated does not tell the entire story. Monroe tells that storythere is this broader and deeper idea of commitment to a client that goes
beyond literal compliance with the rules. There is, as Monroe might say,
the Brougham standard. This is "ethics" properly so called.
The second issue is the systemic failure of judges and the bar to
take seriously this constitution-based idea of effective, zealous
representation. Of what use are these rules if they are not enforced, or if
enforced applied with an uneven hand? This is Monroe as eloquent
social critic. The rules are simply devices with which one might fashion
a system that could merit the name "justice." As matters stand, they are
simply lies the regime tells the people.
PROSECUTORS AND ETHICS

Monroe taught us that to see "the law" at work, one should
concentrate on stories that showed the characteristics that he wished to
praise or condemn. His essay, The Use of Unethical and
Unconstitutional Practices and Policies by Prosecutors' Offices, is an
example of his way of seeing.4 I choose this essay because it
encapsulates so many of the insights that Monroe gave us.
The essay reminds of the Mae West movie in which the prosecutor
asks her, "What! Did you ever hear my integrity questioned?" And she
says, "Honey, I've never even heard it mentioned!"
Monroe's method of attack is itself a lesson. He identifies two
sources of prosecutor misbehavior: office policies that encourage rule
violation and the problem of the rogue prosecutor. For defense counsel,

4. See generally Freedman, The Use of Unethical and UnconstitutionalPractices, supra
note 2.
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the tactics for uncovering and combatting prosecutorial misconduct will
vary depending on the real source of the wrongdoing.
Monroe also reminds us that, regrettably, the official response to
both kinds of wrongdoing is the same: "[A] computerized review has
shown that there have been only 100 reported cases of professional
discipline of federal and state prosecutors in the previous century-an
average of only one disciplinary case per year."' When government
commits wrong, it has more power to inflict harm than any private
person, and given its refusal to police itself, it is a recidivist.
But, Monroe tells us, fear not. The paucity of reported cases of
professional discipline does not mean he will have a hard time finding
examples of bad prosecutor behavior. Rather, there are so many of them
that choosing some for his essay is difficult.
Reading this essay, I cast my mind back to the controversy that
Monroe generated by his early work on defense counsel's duties in
criminal cases. Judges and leaders of the bar attacked him, and some of
them sought to have him disbarred. These same paragons of ethical
virtue turned out to be hypocrites. If they believed what they were
preaching, we would find the law reports full of cases disciplining
prosecutors. To paraphrase Samuel Butler, the officials who condemned
Monroe and yet failed to discipline prosecutors are equally horrified at
seeing ethics doubted and at seeing them practiced.
Imagine if all the interstate highways had billboards saying, "There
is a posted speed limit, but we have decided not to enforce it. Your odds
of getting a speeding ticket are about one in 100,000." What would
drivers do? Prosecutors operate in an environment where even those of
noblest mind are tempted to ignore the rules. It is in this "real world,"
not one imagined by Monroe's detractors, that defense counsel must
make decisions and the lives and liberty of real people are at stake.
Monroe's use of examples is didactic in another way. Our
understanding of prosecutors' ethical violations is helpful to us
only if we can recognize them when we see them, and can understand
how to confront them. As the growing number of exonerations
proves, the state has a habit of covering its misdeeds in secrecy and
mendacity. We need the lawyer's tools of vigorous inquiry to uncover
them and to seek a remedy.
At all the levels of his discourse, therefore, this article teaches us.
Monroe's selections, and the way he tells these stories, put into play all
his qualities of discernment and eloquence. He knows that in making his
5. Id. at 2.
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point he is courting controversy-as was his wont for decades. He takes
extraordinary-well, extraordinary perhaps for you and me, but for him
typical-care to get the facts right and to draw only those conclusions
that he can support.
ATTICUS FINCH
Lawyers are fond of holding up Atticus as an example of a
principled person who happened to be a lawyer, and whose life and work
were something to respect and emulate. Atticus himself, as depicted in
the book, takes on the role of counselor and sage. And so, Monroe
arraigned the Atticus Finch as most folks see him against the image of a
principled well-to-do white lawyer in 1933 Alabama. Atticus does not
come out so well. So far as the book tells us, he didn't do any pro bono
work. He didn't volunteer for the Robinson case; he was appointed by
the court. When he served in the legislature, he did not do anything
about segregation. His pallid excuses for Klan members and lynch mob
participants hardly reflect a stalwart and unyielding sense of justice.
To be sure, there are passages in Atticus's defense of Tom
Robinson that are stirring, and that show a deep understanding of
racial attitudes in 1930s Alabama. That is the Atticus we can all
justly celebrate.
Academics hastened to criticize Monroe's revelatory essays about
Atticus. One critic accused him of "presentism," another of
"chronological snobbery." The Atticus of 1933 should not be judged by
the Freedman of 2000, they said.
The excuse that a lawyer-or anybody else-was simply "a product
of his (or her) time" is pallid and ahistorical. By definition, to borrow
what John Berger said of artists, lawyers mediate between what is given
and what is desired. It is an essential part of our everyday work to
predict what will happen as a case moves along toward resolution. If we
are mired in the past or present, we are not serving our clients. Within
the professional lives of the youngest lawyers to read these words, the
law has changed in sometimes dramatic ways.
A lawyer in 1933 Alabama had to know that a lawyer-driven civil
rights movement had been underway for more than a half-century. If you
doubt, read Susan Carle's book Defining the Struggle: National
Organizingfor Racial Justice, 1880-1915. The record of Klan violence
and lynch mobs was there for anyone to read and know.
On the whole, Atticus flunks the essentially Talmudic test that
Monroe poses for him, and for all the rest of us. No, Atticus was not
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called upon to be Moses. A passage in Deuteronomy suggests that this
would not be possible. He was, however, called upon to be Atticus
Finch, to see what was going on around him and use his intellect and
power to do something about it. Monroe's judgment of Atticus is not
that everybody should work to end injustice. It was rather that if one
claims to be doing that, or is claimed by others to be doing that, the
observant commentator has the right to point out that self-image and
reality are out of harmony with one another.6
CONCLUSION

There is a phrase in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: "acceptance
of responsibility." If you have that, then apparently you can get a lower
sentence. I like the phrase independent of any such consideration. It
expresses a central idea of Monroe's teaching about being a lawyer.
Brougham told us that every lawyer must fully accept the responsibility
for his or her role as an advocate.
The two lawyers for Mr. Maples "accepted responsibility" in a
formal way by entering their appearance, and then failed to fulfill the
duty they had agreed to perform.
Prosecutors, we are taught, have this dual responsibility:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.7

Monroe spoke to us of prosecutors who think that fulfilling one of their
duties excuses them from fulfilling the other one.
And finally, Atticus Finch. Who knows? Perhaps a real-life Atticus
Finch would confess that he fell far short of doing what his own
knowledge and experience had taught him he ought to do. Monroe's
point was perhaps not so much about Atticus as about those who have

6. Harper Lee's newly published novel, Go Set a Watchman, would have made Monroe
smile. See Randall Kennedy, HarperLee's 'Go Set a Watchman,' N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/books/review/harper-lees-go-set-a-watchman.html.
Atticus,
confronted by the civil rights movement, displays all the traits that Monroe attributed to him. The
commitment to justice is not a theory, Monroe would say (again). You have to live it. This footnote
was not in the original article in The ProfessionalLawyer.
7. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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apotheosized him. That is, to the extent we do our jobs we can take pride
in the doing. But we should not think that such scant attention to duty is
worthy of unstinted praise. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, in the poem "Talk,"
speaks of this:
How sharply our children will be ashamed
taking at last their vengeance for these horrors
remembering how in so strange a time
common integrity could look like courage.
We live in a time of violence and war. We are invited every
day to salute fallen soldiers. Certainly we should mourn them. We may
even regret they were sent to fight. But when we think of courage, we
should be guided by Monroe's advocacy and personal example. William
James said of Robert Gould Shaw, whose monument was unveiled in
Boston in 1887:
That lonely kind of courage (civic courage as we call it in times of
peace) is the kind of valor to which the monuments of nations should
most of all be reared, for the survival of the fittest has not bred it into
the bone of human beings as it has bred military valor; and of five
hundred of us who could storm a battery side by side with others,
perhaps not one would be found ready to risk his worldly fortunes all
alone in resisting an enthroned abuse.
Monroe's fierce determination enlivens our memory of him.

